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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The National Army (N.A.) of the Free State (F.S.) had as its forerunner the 
Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.). Many who fought in the Anglo Irish war with 
the I.R.A. continued their service with the N.A. in the civil war of 1922/3. 
Although there was heavy recruitment to the NA at the start of the civil war, the 
veteran members of the I.R.A. provided the backbone of the N.A. Units such as 
the Dublin Brigade remained intact from the Anglo-Irish war to become the 
elite unit of the F. S. National Army. From its inception the N.A. was greatly 
influenced by the many members of its ranks who had been schooled in the art 
of warfare in its many facets, and whose influence was felt from its lower ranks 
to its highest ranks. National army officers, such as Richard Mulcahy, and 
Kevin O’ Higgins, who both fought through the Anglo-Irish war, were to play 
leading parts in the reorganisation of the N.A. after 1923, which laid the basis 
for the N.A. and which still regulates the modem Irish Army.
Following the end of the civil war, the Irish F.S. government was eager to 
reduce the size of the N.A. from its civil war proportions. Its first peacetime 
reorganisation took place in 1924, with massive restructuring of the various 
units of the N.A. (this seems to have established a tradition of Irish Army 
restructures, with further reorganisations taking place in the 1920’s, in 1938/39, 
1945 and 1959, to the extent that the 3rd Infantry battalion is the only Irish
Army unit in continuous existence up to the 1990’s). This , coupled to the 
massive demobilisation of many N.A. soldiers led to the 1924 mutiny. In this 
episode, veterans of the I.R.A. in the N.A. played a major part, claiming they 
were being demobilised while soldiers who had fought in the British Army in 
World War One were being given posts in the N.A. This was untrue, as apart 
from a lew specialists from the British Army ranks, the Free State government 
took pains to reserve positions in the N.A. for those who had fought the Anglo- 
Irish war with the I.R. A. The army mutiny fulfilled the common belief that the 
greatest threat to a revolutionary fledgling government was its own 
revolutionary army. In this instance the threat was met by Mulcahy. In so doing 
he also established the present democratic ethos which guides the modem Irish 
Army, by subjugating the military arm of the state to the civilian government, 
(represented today by the Irish President).
This was shown clearly when deValeras’ Fianna Fail came to power in 1932, 
ousting the Cumman na Geal party which had been in office for the previous ten 
years. Many, among them some Fianna Fail TJD.’s, felt that the N.A. would not 
allow their civil war enemies to become the government of the F.S. Some 
Fianna Fail deputies even carried pistols into their first sitting in the Dail in 
expectation of a military putsch The fact that there was no such attempt showed 
the maturity and stability the N.A provided to the Free State. DeValeras’ F.S. 
came to depend on these attributes with the outbreak of the war in Europe in 
1939.
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The N. A. was ill-equipped to provide, on its own, a great enough deterrent 
against threats of invasion from belligerent nations. The ‘'regulars’ of the N.A. 
became the core around which the forces o f the emergency period were built. 
From its inception, the N. A. had been designed to be able to absorb and train 
any large influx of members to its ranks in times of national crisis. Its ability to 
do so was based on the aim of the military authorities to have each member of 
the other ranks- privates, gunners, ensigns,-trained up the the level o f non­
commissioned officers (N.C.O.). If the lower ranks were trained up to this level 
the N.A. could easily absorb large numbers of new recruits. Due to the lack of 
facilities, the low army pay, and the lack of equipment, this never happened. 
This curtailed the N. A.’s ability to train the new recruits in the early part of the 
emergency, and it was only by the end of 1941 that the combined defence forces 
in the Irish F.S. could hold maneuvers on a national scale. Even these military 
maneuvers, held involving units from each command area, showed up the 
defence forces deficiencies in tactics, training and of course, equipment. By that 
stage, however, the danger of invasion from Germany and a British counter 
invasion, had receded with Hitler’s 1941 invasion of Russia and the end of the 
Battle of Britain. The F.S. had been protected, not by its own forces, but by 
British naval and aerial superiority over Germany.
Demoblisation started at the beginning of 1945, when further recruitment to the 
defense forces was postponed. Active demobilisation after that went smoothly
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as it was applied mainly to those who had been recruited for the duration of the 
emergency, with the local defence Ibices being reduced in size and reorganised 
into the Foras Cosanta Athule (F.C.A.). The Irish Army regulars units were 
returned to their pre-war numbers which put the regular army understrength 
once again, as its pre-war level had always been below the level deemed 
necessary for the army’s peace establishment. Even as late as 1966 the 
Permanent Defence Forces (P.D.F.) stood at 8,249 all ranks, which was only 
71% of the proper peace establishment. Throughout the emergency the army 
was subjected to numerous directions from the Department of Defence which 
were often contradictory or merely confused. No clear national strategy was 
formed by the Department at all during the emergency, with the defence forces 
directed to prepared for invasion from either Germany or Britian, or both 
together from different directions. This lack of direction from the Irish 
government did not change in the post-war years. Many members of the Irish 
army felt they were once again being pushed to the margins, with little evidence 
of any governmental concern for them. They pointed to the new pay scales 
adopted by the government in 1946 as evidence of this, with the arrays pay level 
based on a cost of living estimate of £185 per month, while in the same 
government estimate, the Garda and civil service pay scale was based on a cost 
of living estimate of £270 per month1 . The Irish army felt very much the poor 
cousins of Irish society.
The Irish army found its toughest opponent in the Department of Finance, which 
in all governments after the emergency, curtailed spending on Irelands military. 
The Irish army was crippled in its fight for more resources by the policy of 
neutrality, adopted seemingly by every government in Ireland since World War 
Two. Neutrality came to be accepted in Irish society without thought, though 
deValera had been forced to adopt it by the consensus o f public opinion at the 
time. As an army of a neutral nation, the Irish army lacked a role and 
increasingly came to be seen as non-essential. The Irish army hierarchy was 
further frustrated by the attitude of departmental planners who often put 
proposals from the army on the long finger, or failed to provide the resources for 
proposals agreed on to be properly implemented. A proposal from the army that, 
in as far as possible, the general organisation of combat units would be the 
same in peace as in war-time, was submitted to the Department of Defence in 
1961. In 1968 this proposal was still ‘under consideration’1 by the Department. 
In 1961 the Observer Corp was established without any resources being made 
available by the Department to activate it. It was not surprising that the army 
hierarchy should come to welcome Irish involvement in the United Nations 
(U.N.) peacekeeping activities, as it not only gave the Irish army a practical 
role, but also gave them a valid claim for increased resources in equipment, 
facilities and manpower.
Ireland joined the United Nations in 1956, having been members of its 
predecessor, the League of Nations. The Irish army, however, was ill-prepared
for any large scale commitment to the U.N. peace keeping forces. The army in 
the 1950’s suffered from an overall lack of N.C.O.’s, who are the backbone of 
any military unit. Continued bad recruitment, due mainly to the poor pay, 
together with the lack of N.C.O.’s, meant that all Irish army units operated 
under-strength. For this reason the Irish units that did serve in the Congo were 
composite units formed for the period of duty in the Congo, and disbanded 
afterwards. Personnel for these units were drawn from various units of the Irish 
army, with only one established Irish unit serving in the Congo.
The army also suffered from a number of other internal defects, not least among 
them being the so called ‘career hump’, which officers in 1960 were becoming 
aware of. The ‘hump’ was a result of the sudden intake of officer cadets at the 
beginning of the emergency in 1939. The resultant large number of officers on 
the same rank meant promotions for the these officers, and those below them, 
were effectively held up or blocked totally. Officer morale suffered in this 
situation, but the same thing was to happen in 1969 with the sudden increase in 
I.R.A. activity in the north of Ireland. The 1959 re-organization of the army’s 
peace establishment did not remove these deficiencies, and it totally ignored the 
problem of relying on the First Line Reserve as the army’s main reserve in a 
national emergency. Due to the Irish army’s lengthy period of service, the retired 
soldiers who made up the first Line Reserve were, on average, too old to be 
effective troops. By default therefore, the F.C.A. became the first Line Reserve, 
a role it was incapable of fulfilling. A major aim of the 1959 re-organisation
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was to intergrate the F.C.A. and the Permanent Defence Force (P.D.F.), but this 
proved impossible as the F.C.A. lacked the equipment, manpower or time to 
have a combat efficiency anywhere close to being comparable to the P.D.F.
Even after 1959, the army still lacked a definite policy and was sadly deficient 
in a range of military equipment. Effective modem anti-tank weapons were non­
existent. Some Irish units did not have enough automatic weapons to equip a 
single platoon, when normally all three of a companys platoons would be 
equipped with them. Irish infantry units had no automatic rifles, being equipped 
instead with the Lee Enfield rifle from the second World War. It was only in 
1961 that the first ten Fabrique National (F.N.) automatic rifles were purchased 
and sent to the 35* battalion in the Congo. The army also lacked adequate 
artillery and radio equipment, with the latter being of major importance as a 
necessary piece of equipment in the vast Congo.
The Irish army’s first involvement with the U.N. peacekeeping forces was in 
1958. Five volunteer observers were sent on a U.N. mission to the Middle East, 
to investigate Lebanese complaints regarding U.A.R. infiltration. This mission 
rose to number 50 Irish observers before it was wound down the following 
December. In 1960, Irish assistance was requested for the U.N. mission to the 
Belgian Congo. On the recommendation of the army, the Irish government 
acceded to the request. The first unit was quickly raised and designated the 32 
Battalion under Lt. Col. Mint Buckley, and was activated on the 2nd of July 
1960. The Congo was to lift the claustrophobia of the Irish army and breathe
fresh air into its role as the army of a neutral state. It would also teach the Irish 
army some hard learned lessons, lessons which had been learnt by the Irish 
army’s founders in the Anglo-Irish and Civil War.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONGO CRISIS
CHAPTER ONE: Congo Crisis
The Congo comprised Belgium’s entire African empire. It was larger 
than Europe and inhabited by a multitude of tribes with no common language or 
culture. It was divided into six provinces and had three principal cities; 
Stanleyville in Orientale province, the Colony’s capital, Leopoldville, in the 
province of the same name, and Stanleyville, in Katanga province. Kasai, Kivce 
and Equateur made up the other three provinces of the Congo. No normal roads 
or railways linked the three principal cities, the only real link was by air. Much 
of the country was covered in tropical forests, especially the two northern 
provinces of Orientale and Equateur. Through most of the country flows the 
massive Congo river from which the country got its name, until Mobutu Sese 
Seko changed it to Zaire in 1967. The Irish troops serving with the UN would 
have being hard pressed to select another country more alien to their own native 
environment.
Belgium rule in the Congo could not be claimed to have improved or 
civilised the country to any great extent. Outside the main towns even by 1960, 
the natives of the Congo often lived traditional lives which post dated the arrival 
of Europeans to Africa. Under despotic rule of King Leopold I over his Congo 
empire, the Belgian government had shown little interest in improving their 
colony in any great measure. The problem of the lack of roads, railways and 
schools in the Congo, was added to by the attitude of most Belgians, whether 
settlers, missionaries or politicians: that no matter what you did for the
“African”, at heart he would always be a savage. The Belgian colonial attitude 
could at best be described as paternalistic, but Conor Cruse O’Brien felt it was 
“paternalist in the manner of a father who enjoys sneering at a sons’ 
awkwardness, and keeps impressing on him that he is congenitally and 
incurably defective” 1.
The Congo’s backwardness was a major factor in its failure to pass from 
being a colony to an independent state peacefully. Another factor was the haste 
which the Beligium government showed in turning over political power to the 
Congolese. The Congolese were aware of Belgian plans to grant independence 
in the mid- 1950’s, but the Belgian government did not announce a future date 
for it, or the method by which it was to be implemented. It was only announced 
in January 1959 that independence would be granted at some date “in the near 
future”. Later in the same year it was announced that independent elections 
would be held in mid-1960. This unseemly haste was partly due to the pressure 
the Belgian authorities were under from native Congoese politicians, and also 
partly as Belgium saw independence, as a way of granting the Congo political 
freedom while holding on to their own economic power in the Congo. The 
determination to keep the economic reins of power coloured Beligiums whole 
approach to Congo’s independence, and was to play an increasing part in their 
later dealings with Katanga.
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Elections to form the Congo’s first independent government were set for 
May 1960. Elections for the lower communal and territorial councils were to 
proceed these in December 1959. The May elections were to elect candidates to 
the provincial parliaments in each of the six provinces, and to elect members to 
the central parliament known as the National Chamber. Most of the Congolese 
political parties formed to contest these elections had a narrow support base 
along tribal or ethnic groupings.
Only Patrice Lumumba’s political party, the Municipal Nation du 
Congo (M.N.C.), was a pan-national party aiming to cross tribal lines. With 
little time to properly canvass throughout the Congo, Lumumba’s cause was 
further damaged when his deputy Albert Kalanji formed a breakaway M.N.C. 
based in his native Kasai province. Adding to the election uncertainties was the 
question of the post-election structure of government; was it to be federalist or 
centralised and what were the powers of the provincial parliment to be? A ll the 
Congo’s institutions and structures were to be based on the Beligium common 
law model of the Loi Fundementale. All other questions could be settled after 
the election. That this road to independence would prove a smooth one was an 
optimistic belief on Belgium’s part. None of the Congoiese politicians had any 
experience in self-government. Their political parties were, in the main, tribal 
based, and in the post-election period these parties were expected to reform 
Congo’s institutions, set up new governing structures, and agree on a
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constitution. It was small wonder that many in the Congo feared the imminent 
arrival of independence and were determined to hold on to their own power.
Belgium had encouraged their citizens to settle in the Congo since the 
early part of the century. Though, by 1960, the European settler population was 
only a tiny minority in the Congo (European population was 31,887 in 1960, out 
of a total population of 1,654,200) 2, they made up the only business community 
in the Congo and they held the reins of its economic power. They were spread 
unevenly throughout the country, with the majority living in the province of 
Katanga. Their businesses mainly revolved around the provision of services to 
the main areas of Katanga. The European presence in the Congo was made up 
of these settlers, members of Belgium’s colonial beaurocracy (army and 
civilian), and the skilled technicians who worked for the mining companies in 
Katanga. As Belgium’s colonial beaurocracy was to be dismantled after 
independence, and the technicians worked on short term contracts in Katanga, 
the settlers were the only Europeans who had a long term interest in the Congo, 
having built their lives there. The method of granting independence to the 
Congo gave no safeguards to these settlers, and they were highly suspicious of 
Patrice Lumumba who was regarded as a radical and a communist. European 
settlers, mainly of Belgium origin, were represented by the organisation “Union 
pour la Colonisation” (Ucol) established in 1944. In February 1958, Ucol 
formed the “Union Katangaise” whose policy was to gain the division of the 
Congo into provinces with firm ties to Belgium. Ucol was against a centralised
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rule over the Congo by a black government in Stanlyville, fearing it would leave 
them with no political power or voice. In August 1958 the Belgium minister, 
Petition, inspected the Congo situation. Ucol, through Union Katangaise, made 
representation to him but he rejected these policies. This was a severe blow to 
them as they now saw they had no support horn Belgium. This realisation 
forced Ucol to look to the Katangaese natives for a wider base of support, which 
would present Katanga as a solid political group to Belgium, and show Katanga 
as a less extremist voice in Congo politics.
Such an alignment, black and white, was possible in Katanga because of 
the rising tribal tensions in the mining areas of Katanga. Native Katangans were 
alarmed at the number of migrants flocking into Katanga, mainly from south 
Kasai province, looking for employment in the mines of Katanga. These 
“strangers”, mostly of the Baluba tribe, provided unwanted competition for jobs, 
and this allowed the mining companies to lower wages. The Balubas also 
retained their ethnic grouping in Katanga and this made them politically 
powerful, unlike the native Katangans.
This was seen in the 1957 municipal elections in Katanga which saw a majority 
of Kasai Balubas elected. The only representative organisation of native 
Katangans was the ‘Association des Classes Moyennes Africaines’ (Acmaf) led 
by Moise Tshombe. Acmaf represented the ‘evolues’ which were, in theory, the 
Congolese middle class. In practice the evolues were badly educated Congolese
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who worked only in the lowest ranks of the Belgian colonial bueaurocracy.
Ucol turned to Tshombes’ organisation because it was good propaganda. A 
grouping of ‘educated’ blacks and European whites who be irristable to Belgian 
public opinion, especially as most other Congolese parties were black 
dominated and tribally based. On the 4th of October 1958, the “Confederation 
des Associations Tribales du Katanga” (Conakat) was formed by European 
right wing elements and Katangan natives. It stressed the importance of 
recognising the individual traits o f the Congo’s separate provinces, and horn the 
outset, it also stressed to the Belgian authorities the danger of secession if  they 
ignored this threat.
In December 1959, the communal and territorial council elections were held. 
Eighty-two per cent of the electoral population voted in Katanga, -the highest 
turnout in the Congo, reflecting the politisation of Katangan society. Conakat 
gained 427 seats out of the total 484 seats available, with its main rival being 
the Baluba party of Katanga (Balubakat). The independence elections to form 
the Congo’s provincial and central governments were held in May 1960. In 
Katanga Conakat carried eight out of sixteen seats in the National Chamber, 
and twenty-five out of sixty seats in the provincial government. Conakat gained 
support from the various tribal chiefs elected to the provincial government, who 
feared a centralised government would remove their traditional power as head of 
their tribes. With this support, Conakat controlled thirty-eight votes in the 
provincial government and was able to vote their leader, Moise Tshombe, to the
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position of President of Katanga province. On the first of June the first 
Provincial Assembly was held, but Conakat was blocked from forming a 
government, as the Belgian Loi Fundamental stated a quorum of two-thirds 
was necessary for a parliament to pass legislation. Conakats’ rival parties, 
mainly the Balubakat, had refused to sit in parliament as they claimed the 
election had been fraudulent. With its hands tied at provincial level, Tshombes’ 
Conakat found itself isolated at national level in its fight for federalism in the 
Congo. Pre-election round table talks among all of Congos’ political parties had 
seen the idea of federalism rejected, but Tshombe did gain the right of each 
province to control its own mining concessions.
This was of major importance to the European settlers, who at this stage 
were still a large power in the Conakat parly. Katanga was a mineral rich area 
whose mining production accounted for 75% of the Congo’s total. In 1960, its 
main minerals were copper, zinc, silver, germanium, platinum, radium, uranium 
and raw zinc. Altogether the Katanganese economy contributed 5.25 billion 
Belgian francs out of the Congo’s economic turnover of 11.2 billion, and close 
to fifty per cent of Katanga’s mining concessions were controlled by the Union 
Miniere du Haut Katanga. British and French companies held some stock in this 
company, but the principal stockholder of Union Miniere was the Comite 
Special du Katanga (C.S.K). Before independence, the C.S.K board of directors 
was made up of six people; four designated by the colonial authorities and two 
from the Belgian Compagnie du Katanga. With the granting of independence,
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this meant the new Congolese government would be entitled to appoint four of 
its members to the C.S.K board. To avoid this the stockholders of Union 
Miniere dissolved the C.S.K on the 27th of June 1960. The board was reduced to 
three seats, one each appointed by the Congolese central government, the 
Katangan provincial government, and the Compagnie du Katanga. By doing 
this, Katanga’s mining concessions were kept out of the Central government’s 
total control, and more importantly the European interest in Union Miniere 
could be safeguarded, as by allying itself with either the Katangan government 
or with the Central government, the Compagnie du Katanga and its’ European 
stockholders could, in effect, continue their control of Katanga’s mines. That 
this policy was to the forefront of the Belgian authorities minds could be seen in 
their later dealings with Tshombes’ Katangan government.
On the 14 th of June, the Belgian parliament changed the Loi 
Fundamentale ruling on the issue of the parliamentary quorum. They reduced 
the quorum, enabling the Conakat party to form Katanga’s provincial 
government without the presence of its opposition parties in the parliament, who 
were still boycotting the parliament on the grounds that the election had been 
fraudulent. By 30th of June, the Conakat had formed its government of Katanga 
with Tshombe as its President. This angered the Congo’s Central government 
under Patrice Lumumba, who saw the ruling as evidence of Belgium’s 
ambition to continue their control over the Congo by limiting the Central 
government’s authority over its provinces. Belgium’s control over Katanga
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became more marked when, on the 4* of July, the black rank and file of the 
Force Publique -the ‘pride and joy of the colonial regime’ 4 - mutinied in 
Katanga against their white officers, over the lack of ‘africanisation’ in the 
Force Publique army. By the 8th,the mutiny had spread to Elizabethville. On the 
11111, Tshombe, with white settler backing, declared Katanga independent, but 
also declared it bound economically to Belgium, whom Tshombe appealed to in 
order to restore order over the mutineers. Commant Weber of the Belgian forces 
in Katanga put his “para-commandoes” at the “disposition of Tsombe to protect 
the persons and goods of all” 5. Katanga needed a return to law and order to 
prove to western powers, and especially the Europeans in the Congo, that 
Katanga was a good place for investment and ‘an oasis of peace which 
warranted aid and assistance’ . The importance of Katanga to the Belgians was 
shown by their reinforcement of the Belgian troops there on the 15th of July. The 
Belgian Minister of Defense ordered these reinforcements to occupy the towns 
of Kolwezi, Sakania and Dilolo, -towns through which Katanga exported her 
copper.
Lumumba felt Belgium’s actions blocked him from regaining control of 
Katanga, as he was powerless in the face of Belgium’s military presence there. 
On the 14th, July he broke off diplomatic relations with Beligium. This in turn 
cut Lumumbas’ government off from Beligian aid and also made public opinion 
there more inclined to favor Katanga over the Congolese government, especially 
as their interests in Katanga were more substantial. On the 16 of July, the
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Belgian Prime Minster Gaston Eyskens stated ‘our co-operation is assured to 
Katanga’ 1. Tothis end, the Belgian Technical Mission to Katanga (Mistebel) 
was set up and came to be the real power in Katanga. Lumumbas’ response was 
to appeal by telegram to the United Nations to provide military aid on the 12th of 
July, after Tshombe had declared Katanga totally independent. The Belgian and 
European settlers in Katanga felt Mistebel and the Belgian military presence 
would force any U.N. mission in the Congo to keep out of the Katanga. This 
belief was boosted by the report of the U.N. representative in the Congo, Ralph 
Bunche, who recommended that the U.N. should not operate in the Congo due 
to the opposition of its gendarmary and native warriors. Eventually, pressure put 
on Belgium at the U.N. by Afro-Asian states and the United stated forced them 
to tell Tshombe not to resist the U.N. forces which began operations in Katanga 
on the 31th of August, 1960.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
THE GONGO
CHAPTER TWO: The UN In the Congo
Hie United Nations (UN) mission to the Congo began while 
Dflg Hammarskjokd of Sweden was secretary general of the UN. For the 
mission in the Congo he had the support only of the United States and the 
African and Asian members of the UN. The United States feared the Katangan 
recession might prompt a sens of communist backed secessions in the Congo, 
while the African states saw the crisis in the Congo as endangering and 
unsettling the entire region of Central Africa. Therefore ,both were eager to end 
Katangan independence. Britain, France and Belgium, the first two being 
members of the supreme council of the UN, were antagonistic to Lumumba’s 
central government as they felt he was a communist radical, and,while Belgium 
activity supported Katangan independence, Britain and France merely provided 
a measure of moral support for it, mainly by constant criticism of UN actions in 
Katanga. Since both the enemies and allies of Katanga in the UN saw 
communism as a factor in the crisis, the Communist block in the UN never had 
a large measure of influence  on the United States tor continued support of the 
UN mission in the Congo. This was necessary as the United States was also the 
major financial contributor to the UN coffers.
Hie United Nations missions are commonly called peacekeeping 
missions but the only form of conflict control mentioned in the UN charter is 
“peace by persuasion” in Chapter VI “ Envisioning Enforcement”. Dftg 
Hammarskjöld felt that a new chapter was needed- to be numbered “six and a 
half”1. The precise role of the UN mission in the Congo was to prove
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problematic for UN representatives there. The UN mission in the Congo, the 
Organisation des Nations United an Congo (ONVC), had its role defined by the 
UN Secretary General, in the way he felt reflected the attitudes of the UN 
Security Council. This role was then implemented by the UN representative in 
the Congo as he felt the Secretary General wished it to be implemented. Often 
the various chains of command of the UN emphaised their own main concerns 
in the actions the UN forces carried out. This confusion was further shown in 
the resolutions of the Security Council which were meant to guide the ONVC.
At the time when UN troops first arrived in Katanga, the last Security Council 
resolution of the 9th of August 1960 stated “the United Nations force in the 
Congo will not ...in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of 
any internal conflict” 2. Yet on 20* September, the Security Council adopted a 
resolution which requested the Secretary General to assist the central 
government restore their authority throughout the Congo, including Katanga. 
This was hard to reconcile with the resolution o f 9* August, a resolution which 
the General Assembly of the UN at the same moment fully supported. This 
confusion over ONVC’s aim in Katanga not only angered Lumumba’s central 
government, but also affected the ONVC forces who had to cary out an ill- 
defined role in dangerous areas.
In Katanga, Tshombe had managed to replace departing Belgian 
regular troops with his gendarmery under the Belgian Major Crèvecour. Marry 
Belgian officers were seconded to this new force from the Belgium army. By 
August 1960, Katanga was under severe pressure from Baluba tribesmen 
coming from Kasai, and units of the Central government’s Armée National Du
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Congo (A.N.C.) advancing into Katanga. Brussels provided arms and 
equipment to Katanga’s gendannery and pressurised the ONVC to stop the 
A.N.C.’s advance. Tsambe’s strength gradually increased due to this aid, and 
the revenue from Union Minières’ continued production which was paid only to 
the Katangan province. On the 5th September, the President of the Congo, 
Kasavulu, dismissed Lumumba as Prime Minister. Belgium welcomed the new 
“moderate” central government and covertly began to extend its influence in 
Stanlyville, which meant that their concern for Katanga gradually lessened. 
Joseph fleo became Congo’s new Prime Minister, and was known as a 
moderate with federalist leanings. In north Katanga there was increased 
violence by Baluba tribesmen who were often drugged on hemp.
The first Irish Battalion to serve as UN troops in the Congo was 
the 32fd Battalion. This was deployed in the quieter province of Kivu,where 
deficiencies in tropical clothing and wireless equipment were soon discovered. 
In Kivu, the Irish found their role of peacekeepers relatively straightforward, 
with no attempt being made to disarm native armed forces, mainly because 
there was no existing conflicting forces as there were in Katanga. Irish army 
units patrolled constantly, and although there were tensions between the native 
forces and the Irish, no shots were fired. The 32fld Battalion learned many 
leasons about kit and conditions which were passed on to the next Irish 
battalion to arrive, the 33rd Battalion, in August 1960. The 33rd Battalion 
became part of the buffer zone of the UN units in north Katanga whose role was 
to stop A.N.C. incursions into Katanga and to end clashes between the 
Katangan Balubas and Tshombe’s gendannery. This proved to be impossible,
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as the UN forces were too few in number to either stop A.N.C. units slipping 
through their zone, or to patrol all of north Katanga ending the often bitter 
Baluba-gendarmery clashes. The problems of the UN’s ambivalent mission in 
the Congo has its result in the ambush of an Irish patrol under Lt. Kevin 
Glees on at Niembia in November 1960. Eight members of the patrol were 
killed, one later died from wounds, and two survived. The patrol in two pick-up 
trucks ran into a roadblock of felled trees, manned by drugged Balubas. In line 
with their orders only to fire when fired upon, the patrol held its fire and Lt. 
Gleeson called out a greeting, only to be answered by arrows. In spite of this 
tragedy the Irish continued their activity in north Katanga with its morale intact.
Elsewhere in the Congo the Central government under Deo saw 
its authority reduced to the province of Leopoldville as a new element of 
Lumumbist supporters spread violence throughout the Congo. Lumumba had 
been kept a prisoner by Ileos’ government after his dismissal. The ONVC didn’t 
recognise Ileos’ government in Leopoldville as they felt it was unconstitutional, 
as it had never been voted in by the National Chamber. This meant Ileo got no 
UN support or aid from Belgium. In February 1961 the position in Katanga 
was further complicated by Tsombes’ hiring of foreign mercenaries to serve as 
the backbone of his gendarmety. Their number was mainly made up of British, 
Rhodesian and South Africans, but later the mercenaries were mainly French, 
especially after deGaulle granted Algerias’ independence. Strengthened by 
about 400 white mercenaries, Katangan forces were very successful against the 
A.N.C. and Baluba warriors, as they employed even greater terror than the bitter 
Congo conflict had already seen. At this stage Katanga was the powerful
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province in the Congo, a power exercised by Tsombe when he allowed 
Lumumba to be killed when the Leopoldville government turned him over to 
Katanga’s control, in January 1961.
This however, proved to be the zenith of Katangas’ control over 
Congo affairs. From September 1960, the Belgian government had been 
drawing closer to Heo’s central government, at the same time withdrawing from 
Katanga and exerting pressure on Tsombe to accept an accord with Ileo. This 
turnaround drew bitter comment from Katanga, but Belgium increasingly felt 
its interests could be better safeguarded by the Central government. ONVC’s 
actions were a factor in this, as Belgium saw that the ONVC had come to 
regard Katanga as its major opponent. The gradual cutting of Belgium’s ties 
with Katanga forced Tshombe into heavier reliance on the more radical 
elements of his government, such as Munongo, the Katangan Minister of the 
Interior, and on the terrors inflicted by “les after”, his mercenaries.
The ONVC relationship with the Congo’s central government 
changed when Deo’s government was replaced. A government led by Adoula 
was voted in by the National Chamber in line with the Congo’s constitution. 
This closer relationship between the Congo government and ONVC left 
Katanga isolated. ONVC soon became Katanga’s main opponent in its fight to 
maintain its secession attempt. Calls from ONVC to Katanga to expel its 
foreign troops were ignored by Tshombe, as his gendarmery couldn’t perform so 
well without the direct assistance of its Belgian officers or its white 
mercenaries. The ONVC’s role in the Congo was once more dramatically
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changed when the Security Council of the UN adopted the resolution on the 2 111 
of February 1961, which directed the ONVC to take measures for the immediate 
withdrawal of all Belgian and other military personnel, including mercenaries. 
Katanga was militarily very fragile in the face of this resolution if it were 
implemented. On the 2 111 of November, a further resolution, authorised the use 
of the “requisite measure of force, if  necessary” to enforce the February 
resolution.
The February resolution coincided with the arrival in Katanga of 
Conor Cruise O’Brien as the new representative of the UN there. He saw his 
first job as ensuring the implementation o f this resolution. On the 2nd of April an 
Indian Battalion of troops arrived as reinforcement for the UN in Katanga. 
Increasingly Tshombe came under pressure from both Conor Cruise O’Brien 
and UN forces ,who intervened to stop Katangan military operations or to 
intercept its units to expel foreign troops. This marked the start of the ONVC 
becoming more active against the Katangan government, especially since ,on 
the 17th of April »Adoula’s Leopoldville government had accepted the February 
resolution and requested ONVC aid to reorganise the A.N.C. forces. By June 
the ONVC had helped Adouia to reopen the Central government’s parliament. 
Katanga continued to boycott this parliament ensuring that it would be 
orientated “against” Katanga. The final mark of Tshombe’s isolation came in 
April 1961, when the new Belgian government led by Lefevreand Spaak started 
to disengaged from Katanga in favor of Leopoldville.
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The failure of ONVC to make any great headway on ridding 
Katanga of foreign troops led to it’s first offensive operation in the Congo : 
Operation Rumpunch. The operation was designed by Conor Cruise O’ Brien, 
together with the Swedish Colonel Bjom Egge and the Commander of all UN 
forces in the Congo; General Sean Mac Eoin of the Irish Army. Rumpunch was 
the apprehension and expulsion, by UN forces, of all foreign military forces in 
Katanga, together with the occupation of the post office and radio station in 
Elisabethville. Rumpunch was a sweeping success netting 338 mercenaries out 
of the estimated total o f443. The one hundred who escaped however were 
actually the most dangerous elements - m ainly French ex-Foreign Legion troops 
who had been involved in the mutiny against deGaulle in Algeria, and whose 
activities in Katanga were the most bloody. Those who had been caught were 
mainly Belgian officers who were less dangerous to the ONVC. Rumpunch did 
however, force Tshombe to immediately “Afiicanise” his Katangan forces, 
thereby weakening them.
The Irish units involved in Rumpunch were the 1st Infantry 
Group under Colonel John O’Donovan, and the 35th Battalion under Lt. Col.
■i
Hugh McNamee. Col. Eugene O’Neills’ 34 Battalion had served from January 
1961 up to June before operation Rumpunch and had departed alter banding 
over to the 35th Battalion having had a quiet tour in Elisabethville. Before 
Rumpunch ,the 1st Infantry Group defended Kamina airbase which was some 
200 miles north of Elisabethville. During Rumpunch ,the 1st Infantry Battalion 
along with units of the 35th Battalion were involved in defending Katanga 
airport in Elisabethville against strong attacks mounted by gendarmery and
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white mercenaries. During this action the gendarmes lost twenty dead and over 
fifty wounded, with the Irish also coming under fire from Katanga’s lone air 
force jet - a Fouga aircraft. The 35th incurred no casualties and managed to 
capture seventy three white mercenaries.
The partial success of operation Rumpunch didn’t force 
Tshombe to bade down or negotiate. By this time Tshombe was controlled by 
radical right wing white settlers, and also by the enigmatic Munungo, whom 
Conor Cruise O’Brien suspected of killing Lumumba with his bare hands. Lack 
of progress lead to a second military operation by the ONVC, instigated by the 
ONVC representative in Leopoldville, Khiary, and carried out by Connor Cruise 
O’ Brien in Elizabethville. This was operation Marthar, which began at 4am, on 
the 13 of September. ONVC’s aims were the arrest of Katangas’ leading 
politicians, among them Tshombe and Munongo. ONVC forces were to secure 
the post office and radio studios, and raid Katangas’ offices of the Ministry of 
Information. In effect, the ONVC was to stage a coup d’etat’ in Elizabethville, 
opening the way for the arrival o f a Commissaire d’etat from Leopoldville who 
would assume power, on the behalf of the Congo’s Central government. 
Operation Morthor, however, failed ,as the ONVC’s lack of an effective 
intelligence network meant all but one of three intended targets escaped. Some 
of them, like Munongo, had been expecting the ONVC’s attempt and had been 
already staying away from their personal residences. In all events, the failure to 
arrest Tshombe meant his gendatmery and the mercenaries would continue to 
harass UN troops in Elizabethville, as they received no cease-fire order from 
him. Over the following week, while UN forces secured Elizabethville in the
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face of Katangan opposition, pressure mounted on Dflg Mammarskjold at the 
UN headquarters to call off ONVC operations, which the Western media 
portrayed as bloody and high-handed. Chi the 20th of September a cease-fire was 
signed by Khiary and Tshombe, which returned the situation to its pre-Morthor 
position, and the Katanga secession was maintained.
The Irish unit involved in operation Morthar was once more the 
35 battalion. Their task in Elizabethville was to arrest the Katangan m inister of 
finance, Kibive, and they were the only UN unit to actually accomplish the 
arrest of their target. They were also directed to size and establish a road block 
at the railway tunnel, as well as securing the refugee camp on the outskirts of 
Elizabethville. “C” company of the 35th battalion came under heavy and 
sustained fire in establishing their road block on the railway tunnel, but no 
casualties were suffered. In all, causalities from the operation in Elizabethville 
amounted to only eleven UN troops dead, with Katangan forces suffering some 
fifty dead.. The morale of the ONVC was dealt a severe blow on the 17th of 
September when news of the surrender of 184 Irish troops in Iadotville reached 
Elizabethville. These troops, making up of the 35th battalions situation was 
shattered by the sudden arrival of fresh mercenary reinforcements which ended 
the fraternising and forced the unprepared Irish to surrender. “A” company had 
been caught just as they had almost turned around their bad state o f affairs.
They were taken into captivity by the mercenaries, and were released only after 
the cease-fire for operation Marthar had been signed.
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The failure of operation Marthar resulted in the resignation of 
Connor Cruise O’Brien and the replacement of General Sean MacEoin as 
commanding officer of ONVC forces. D ig  Hammarskjöld was also a victim of 
Morthar- he was killed in a plane crash in North Katanga. He was replaced by 
U Thant as acting secretary general of the UN. The situation in Elizabethville 
continued to deteriorate, with Katangan forces denying ONVC troops freedom 
of movement and sniping the headquarters of the Irish battalion in the city. 
Operation Unokat was carried out on the 15* and 16th of December to end this 
harassment.
The 36 battalion landed in Katanga just in time to take part in 
this Operation. The 36th and part of the 35th battalion, as part of the ONVC’s 
1st brigade, were to attack and capture Camp Mas sard and block roads out of 
Elizabethville before moving to end Katangan resistance in the city. The 36th 
first came under fire as they landed in Elizabethville to rotate with the 35th 
battalion. Further missions were carried out by the 36th to secure road junctions 
on the flanks of the Swedish battalion who were preparing to move on 
Elizabethville. The Irish part of this attack was to seize the railway tunnel and 
they accomplished this mission- named operation Sarsfield- suffering a number 
of casualties, among them three dead. Following the taking of Elizabethville, 
the 36th battalion had to organise patrols to control looting. Some days later ,a 
platoon o f“C” company from the 36*, under Captain Keyes stopped a riot at 
bayonet point, which had developed in the refugee camp outside Elizabethville. 
For the rest of their tour the 36th reverted to keeping the peace by active 
patrolling, manning road blocks and controlling refugees.
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The succeeding 37th battalion under Lt. Col. Don O’Broin 
arrived in May 1962. Its tour was relatively quiet and its role consisted mainly 
of patrols and security. The relative calmness of Katanga was due to the 
meetings held between Tshombe, Ralph Bunche, representative of the UN in 
Katanga, and the American Ambassador Guillion at Kitona on the 20th of 
December 1961. At this meeting Tshombe recognised the authority of the 
Congo Central government and agreed to move to end Katangas’ secession. 
Although Tshaobe had entered into this agreement, it was necessary for the 
Katangan council of ministers to also accept it. They, however, declared 
themselves incompetent to decide this issue and sent the case to the assembly 
which commenced deliberations. Eventually the assembly accepted the 
agreement in February 1962, and Tshombe commenced talks with the 
Congo’s’ Prime Minister Adoula. These talks dragged on horn February to 
June, and dispite huge ONVC encouragement, facilitation’s and “good 
officers” the talks finally broke down on the 26th of June 1962, as Leopoldville 
felt Katanga had not moved its position significantly, with the major stumbling 
block being the question of control over Katangan resources and revenue.
After this failure, the ONVC and the United States sought to pressurizes 
Katanga by means of economic sanctions and the carrot of a fund for Katanga’s 
redevelopment. This was known as the “U Thant plan”, and the Secretary 
General declared it was non-negotiable and strictly to a time scale. The time 
scale was important as the ONVC effort in the Congo had become a major 
financial strain for the UN, and its operations there could not continue much
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longer. Tshombe, however, was still looking for time, and on the 15* of 
December 1962, he refused to continue talks along the lines of the U Thant 
plan.. U Thant decided on a final show of force, and on the 28th of December, 
ONVC forces went on the offensive, dismantling Katangan military road blocks 
and clearing Eliyabethville, once again, of Katangan forces. ONVC operations 
continued into January 1963, by which time Tshombe and his remaining 
mercenaries were in the town of Koliveyi in south Katanga. From there, the last 
town under his control, Tshombe issued a statement declaring he was “ready to 
proclaim to the world that the Katangan recession is ended”. While his 
mercenaries fled into Angola, Tshombe surrendered to the ONVC. On January 
23, Minister fleo entered Elizabethville as representative o f the Congo Central 
Government.
The 38th Battalion, under Lt. Col. Paddy Delaney, served from 
November 1962 to May 1963, and played a major part in later ONVC military 
operations. In the opening phase of the last operations, the heavy mortar troop of 
the 38th Battalion provided vital support to the Indian Brigade in its attack on 
Elizabethville. The Irish also took part in the attack on Kibushi, which, due to 
artillery fire from the supporting Ethiopian 3rd Brigade, was captured easily. 
From there, the Irish advanced and took a number of towns along the Benguela 
Railway, entering the deserted Kalweyi along with other ONVC units on 
January 21,1963. The 39th infantry Battalion, under Lt. Col. Pat Dempsey, took 
over from the 38th Battalion in April, and it maintained law and order in its 
sector through vigorous patrolling. The 39th Battalion was understrength 
compared to the 38th Battalion, and it was badly stretched in trying to maintain
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the same area as that maintained by the 38th Battalion. The 2nd Infantry Group 
was the last Irish unit to serve it the Congo as the ONVC started to phase out its 
operations during the term of the 2nd Infantry Group. It served from October, 
1963, "when the 39th Battalion left, until May 26,1964, when it returned to 
Ireland. The 2nd Infantry Group was led by Lt. Col. Redmond O’Sullivan, and 
was based in the mining town of Kalwegi, where, as well as maintaining law 
and order, it managed to settle a strike in one of the Union Miners’ mines. On 
June 30th 1994, the ONVC completed its military withdrawal from the Congo.
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CHAPTER THREE
ON THE GROUND
CHAPTER THREE: On the ground
Approximately 3100 Irish troops served 'with the ONVC forces in 
the Congo, from July 1960 to May 1964. The Congo was not only a new 
experience for the Irish army as a whole but also a novel experience for its 
individual soldiers, who found there, an environment quite alien from their 
native country. The culture of the Congo, and its heat and hostility, were felt 
most dramatically, and on a first-hand basis by the foot-soldiers o f the Irish 
units. How they reacted to these, and the events which enveloped them, is a 
story less well told than that of the political history o f the Congo. The following 
interviews attempt to give an insight into the daily travails of the rank and file 
Irish soldier. These interviews are in the soldiers own words, and show the 
concerns uppermost in their minds. They also show their perception of the 
situation in the Congo, which was often at odds with that of the ONVC 
hierarchy.
The interviews were granted to me on the condition that the 
interviewees remained anonymous. Thus the names used are fictitious, but their 
stories are a true record of the memory of the experiences of two members of the 
Irish army who served with the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the 
Congo. I respect their wish for anonymity, as the views expressed here by them 
may not reflect, or may may be at variance with, the published version of the 
experiences of the Irish army in the Congo.
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Interview No.1
Joe joined the Irish army in 1940, and served until 1967. Hie 
was part of an artillery unit before his Congo service, and he served as part of a 
mortar platoon with “B” Company of the 37th Battalion in the Congo. He was in 
the Congo from June until November, 1962, with the rank of sergent.
“The units that went out to the Congo were made up o f a 
number of different units — there weren't specified artillery or other units. 
They were grouped together in companies, and there was a mortar platoon 
with each company. The make up of each company in the Congo came from  
all ranks from different home-based units.
We had a comparatively easy time. Though there were 
skirmishes in different areas, we were never directly involved. What actually 
happened was when there were skirmishes, we would be drafted in 
overnight, from one end of the Congo to the other. We (the 37th Battalion) 
were shifted from the Congo to the Southern province of Katanga, but 
things had quietened down by that time, and there weren't any skirmishes 
efter we arrived The previous Battalion (the had trouble all right, but 
we only had slight trouble. We were never based in EhzabethviOe, shipped 
there by plane because the roads were bad. We were later sent to North 
Katanga to a place called Feticoville Farm, where the King(Leopold 1) used 
spend his holidays.
Our patrols- our day to day activity- were to keep apart the rival 
factions. Roadblocks, barriers or something tike these were used by us to 
stop them moving around. We did not have the manpower to guard all 
areas, but we could stop road transport. It was to stop the factions coming 
in to contact mainly. We always knew when Tshombe was coming- he had 
fifty motorbikes with him blowing their horns as he swept past. Some of us
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met him after a football match against another unit at which he was 
present. We were introduced to him after the match, and I  was talking to 
him for a minute or two. He was like most “big people”-w ell rigged out in 
the best clothes. When they are in command they go out to took the part 
whether they are the part or not.
In one area where we were, we had mercenaries under guard. 
I was guard commander, and I  remember them w ell—we knew who and 
what they were all right, there was an American, but mostly they were 
French-A Igerian, and we had some o f the most important ones as prisoner 
under armed guard. 1 think they were later shipped out of the Congo, but it 
was so easy for them to turn around and walk back in again, and this was a 
huge problem with the mercenaries.
We had, to a certain extent, problems with the settlers. You 
see, the young people were all right to us, but the older people were 
different. They were there with the Belgi, while we had onty arrived. In 
general, while there were tensions, there was no real trouble — we got on
O.K. We were free with them — tike we were never under curfew around 
them. In an ordinary day, you could go into town and have a drink with 
them, or go to a restaurant, the only danger was from factions o f the 
Gendarmery, but in regards to the ordinary people, we got on well with 
them. Mostly, settlers had left when the trouble started, especially outside 
EtizabethviUe and the mining towns. They left their houses and an awful lot 
else — and incidently, in some of the places we went in Katanga, it was 
their houses that we occupied—it was very good accommodation. I f they 
still had been there, we would have had to encamp and so fourth.
Even after the Niemba ambush, morale was quite high — no 
matter where you served, morale was high. In fact, the Irish were noted for 
their high spirit, and they were always well liked by the people of the 
countries they go to with the UN. Discipline was never very tough —
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overseas discipline had to be of a high standard as the soldier there is 
coming across new situations all the thne. The Jadotviiie episode was a 
real worry for the army. Though I wasn't there at the tim e,I had a friend 
who was actually among the captured there. I f they hadn't been released 
soon after, the Army would probably have made an attempt to get them out. 
My unit had spent some time in Jadotviiie, in the refugee camps there —  
mostly Balubas who had been evacuated or who had fled the Katanganese 
army. There were thousands, literally thousands —  it was terrible it was so 
crowded there, horrible conditions, and so little we could do for all o f them.
The Congo was a culture shock, a completely different 
environment. You were going from a peacetime environment, and most of 
the Irish army had never been in a battle, though they had been preparing 
and preparing, and in the Congo, they thd not know what to expect Of 
course, the groundwork for us had been made by previous battalions, and 
we had been briefed and everything had been outlined to us. Our role in the 
UN was as peacekeepers, to negotiate and not to take sides, whichwas 
important. We acted as the buffer between factions to stop clashes. Of 
course, in the Congo, this was often hard for us to do as they were all black, 
and so it was hard to distinguish between the factions. It was Ok when white 
mercenaries led them, or with the Baluba warriors who wore three white 
stripes down their cheeks. Of course some of our UN contingents were also 
black, such as the Indians, but they had certain features differences to 
distinguish them flrom the African blacks.
The Army, as at home, was subject to certain rules about 
opening fire You were only allowed to fire to, say, stop yourself being 
forcibly disarmed In all, there were five occasions which allowed you to 
use your weapon, and that order was the same in the Congo as it was at 
home. We had only got just basic equipment, unlike today. Old Lee Enfield 
rifles and a few machine guns, with the F.N. rifle not coming in until later 
when they needed an automatic. With uniforms ,the original set-up was that
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the Army went out with the uniform they wore here. Then they designed a 
uniform for them overseas in the hot weather. The first battalion to go out 
went out in what was termed " the buUs wool*', but later battalions got 
green and ojf-green uniforms, one for walking out in and the other for 
combat
A ll in all, the Congo was a very good experience f ir  the army, 
in that it was the first overseas assignment of entire battalions. It prepared 
them for thefiture UN tours. The whole standard o f training was changed 
due to overseas service. Battlewise, they were better prepared in dress and 
equipment it was a great experience for them, and, as members of the UN, 
they had to be better trained and equipped. It was the best thing to happen 
to the Irish army. I f  you look at recruitment and the many thousands 
fighting to get in , it shows you the attraction of overseas service f ir  a lot of 
people, with the added danger factor, the army was never so popularize a 
career before it started its UN duties than it was after.”
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Interview No. 2.
Paul joined the army in 19S9, and served for 12 years. He 
finished with the rank of sergent,but his rank in the Congo was that of 
corporal. He name from a home-based unit of the 2nd Battalion to serve two 
tours in the Congo, the first with the 35a Battalion, and the second with the 2nd 
Infantry Group. Altogether, he served in the Congo from June to December 
1961, and from September 1963 to May 1964.
"Trained in Cathal BrughafBarracks). Spent some time in 
T* Battalion, transferred into .5* in Cottins(Barracks). From there, went out 
to Glen of Imal for special training and from there to the Curragh.
Went out (to the Congo) to the 35th infantry Battalion 
attached for special services, the idea bang if  the BattaUon got into trouble, 
they sent for us. There was exactly one platoon o f us, and anywhere the 
Battalion got into trouble we’d be sent in to sort it out, and then leave the 
mopping up to the Battalion. I  served with the 35th for their tour, came home 
for a months leave, and then went back out there again. After our month in 
Ireland, training, we went back out with the 2nd Infantry Group, we were 
there four weeks before they arrived
With the 35?*, we were based in Leopoldville, the Battalion 
being based in Jadotville. When I  went out the second time, I  was based in 
Katwegi with the T d Infantry Group. That group was out for 9 months.
There was a Battalion o f Gurkos, and some Canadians who did signals, in 
Katwegi also. In Katwegi, we were based in a place called Camp RuaL
The kit itse(f was bloody lousy. It was designed for Irish 
conditions —for fighting any possible war in this type of country. It was 
never designed for tropical use, apart from the uniform itself— the walking-
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out uniform, which was the only part designed for tropical use. It was bloody 
ridiculous.
We came into contact with perhaps eight of them, caught two, 
and they were immediately handed over to the Gurkos. Them buggers were 
armed to the teeth —  any sophisticated weapons going. We had Gustavs and 
Bren guns MK5, that sort of thing,but these guys had very sophisticated 
weapons. It was like trying to run a Mini up against a tank. Our whole 
platoon was chasing these guys for eight days, while they were laughing at 
us the whole way down. They could pick us off any time they wanted. One 
day, they'd be in front of us, the next behind us —  nobody had a damn clue. 
You got to understand that these were the first experiences of coming under 
realfire for most o f us. Its all very wellfor guys to go up andfire at targets, 
or going down to the Glen oflm al and have officers shooting over your 
head You knew in your heart them guys won't go anywhere near you Its a 
different story when they're really shooting at you and you're half shitting 
yourself. We were all kind of, how would you say, 44 hold me back and let me 
at them" kind o f way—you want to be held back, but you'd also want to let 
go at them, because them buggers wera letting go at you with real weapons. 
But having said that, once you got your orders, you would go out and give 
your best, because you had no choice— it was you or them. That was the 
only frightening experience we had The tribes themselves weren't anywhere 
near armed— old Lee Enfields and arrows. I f some of them fired off a 
round, you were more at risk from rust poisoning than from the bulla itself. 
We had three or four incidents. We had a riot in Kotwey over a sack of flour. 
Somebody robbed a sack of flour and a riot erupted when they tried to stop 
the thief with all his relatives coming out to help him. Everybody was 
related out there. That was with the 2nd, and whoever was in charge just let 
it bum itself out I  think it went on for six hours. Then he sent us in to mop it 
up. We were termed the 'heavy mob' — went in ,kicked a few butts and left 
the rest to the Battalion.
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The Belgian settlers were fantastic to us. They were etemaify 
gratefid to have us around You could feel that they were praying for you to 
stay there. I remember, just beyond amine shaft somewayfrom Camp 
Ruai, there was a Belgian community, and every time we went up there 
,they’d give us wine, food and literally anything we wanted They supported 
the mercenaries as well, seeing them the same as u s—protecting the 
whites, which, when you realty looked into it, was what we did The 
mercenaries, though,would change sides in thirty seconds without batting an 
eye.
After events such as Niemba and Jadotville, everyone was 
down for a while, but w realised there was nothing you could do about it, 
and you had to get on with it. Morale was always pretty high Ifyougot 
into a spot o f bother, for a day or twoyou’d be on a highqfler your shooting 
exercises, bid there would always be someone to break the spell and bring 
you down to earth Apart from that, morale was always high, because you 
were depending on each other —you were depending on them and they 
were depending on you — real teamwork. I was a Corporal, in charge of a 
squad of eight men, three squads in a platoon. You were depending on them 
for anything you overlooked, and they looked to you for leadership and 
guidance, because everyone was in the same boat. There were guys there 
that I  didn’t meet until the Curragh just before we left (for the Congo), but 
instantly, once the squad was formed, there was instantaneous rapport, and 
the squad was bang on. It just jelled together because we knew we were 
going away and what we had to do. AU three squads became tike three 
different guys, each squad a mate who depended on each other, but could 
act on its own.
There was a certain amount of friction between us and units 
tike the Gurkos, because it always seemed, whether it was a result of their 
training or our training, they always seemed to be better off than we were. 
They got the better rations and the better camping ground The first time I
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was out there J  spent five months on a camp bed under canvas, and that’s 
an experience in itself, with all the dirt and God-knows-whaL It was the 
camaraderie, though, that kept the morale high.
We had no losses, only a sprained wrist being the worst thing 
we had. I  have since lost my eyesight in one eye, and the cause was traced 
back to the dust in the Congo, which affected my eye in later years, blinded 
it.
The experience of the Congo did improve the Irish army —  they 
learned some important lessons from it anyway. It made Cyprus, which was 
pretty rough in the beginning regarding facilities, easier to handle due to the 
Congo experience. The army also learned a lesson in relation to the officers role - 
— it had always been a case of us and them, and I  think this was the most basic 
lesson taught by the Congo. The other one was that what matters here in Ireland 
in regards to marching and parades, out there meant nothing. There was no need 
for it They tried that with the first consignments to the Congo, but it didn't last 
for long, especially as between twelve and three, the sun was directly overhead, 
and nobody could lift a bloody finger in the heat It was tike an oven with the heat 
fu ll blast on. You couldn't move. Bui they teamed their lesson.”
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CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
After Katanga’s secession had been ended by ON VC, Moise 
Tshombe went into exile in Spain. His exile was brief, for on the very day that 
ONVC finally withdrew its troops, on June 30th 1964, Tshombe was brought 
back to be designated Prime Minister of the Cogolese Central Government. He 
was brought back to put down a separist movement in the Eastern Congo of the 
sort he himself had started in Katanga. This time, Tshombe had the backing, 
not only of Belgium and Union Miniere, but also of the Western powers, 
including the United States. A totally new menace, far more appalling to 
Western eyes than that of Katanga, was sweeping the country. Simba rebels, led 
by Pierre Mulele, who ‘baptised’ them to protect them from bullets, and 
dedicated to the dead Lumumba, had put the terrified A.N.C. to flight. Tshombe 
quickly recalled his mercenaries and put the Irishman, Mike Hoare, in 
command. Hoare commanded the mercenary army, which he called “5 
Commando”, from July 1964 to November, 1965, and played a major role in 
ending the bloody Simba revolt. The end of the Simba revolt saw the end of 
Tshombe’s reign as Prime Minister. Having outlived his usefulness, he was 
overthrown by General Sese Seko Mobutu, who, on November 25th, 1965, 
seized power in a bloodless “coup”. Hoare was dismissed, and, by the 
beginning of 1965, Mobutu had got rid of the remaining European mercenaries 
after they had attempted, and nearly succeeded, in staging a “coup” against 
him Mobutu then declared himse lf  “President for Life”, and the Congo crisis 
finally ended.
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The crisis had been precipitated, to a great extent, By the 
Belgians handling of the Congo. Independence was granted far too quickly, with 
no safeguarding structures. Belgian support o f ,and aid to, Tshombe’s secession 
attempt, was critical, as without it, he would never have made the attempt. 
Belgium had opposed and hindered the ONVC effort in Katanga, and it was 
only when it had disengaged form Katanga in favour of the Congolese Central 
Government, that the ONVC could effectively end Katanga’s secession. On its 
side, the UN headquarters had hindered the ONVC effort from the outset by not 
properly defining the role it was expected to play in the Congo. The political 
battles fought in the UN also caused casualties in the ONVC, notably Conor 
Cruise O’Brien. O’Brien clearly felt his role was to implement the UN 
resolution of February 21st, but when this proved too costly in political terms, he 
was forced to resign. In the end, Secretary-General U.Thant used the same 
forceful and “high-handed” tactics to end Katanga’s secession that O’Brien had 
tried to use in “Operation Morthaf”. In the short term the UN was successful, 
but this proved to be only the first chapter in the Congo’s battle for stability, a 
battle fought for years after the disengagement of the UN from the Congo, and 
without further aid from it.
For the Irish, their experience in the Congo had a number of 
“firsts”. “Operation Morthaf3 was the first time the Irish army had mounted an 
offensive against an organised enemy since the Irish Civil War. The 1st Infantry 
Group, which served in “Operation Rumpunch”, was the first unit of its kind — 
two infantry companies instead of the normal three in a battalion — to be 
commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel with a small headquarters staff. The Congo
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also gave Irish staff officers their first experience in the logistics of equipping, 
maintaining and planning tactical operations for a large body of Irish troops in a 
conflict situation. Throughout its period in the Congo, the Irish army performed 
well. After a few minor problems, it learned valuable lessons from its 
experience there, earning the respect of its fellow UN units which was reflected 
in the UN invitation to the Irish Army to serve in Cyprus in 1965. Connor 
Cruise O’Brien felt the UN forces in the Congo consistently outfought their 
mercenary opponents and the gendarmerie whose “ armament was 
often.....superior to that of the UN forces. For example they had the Belgian 
NATO model FN rifle, whereas the Indian rifles were 1918 style. They had 
modem Mercedes armoured cars, where the Irish had 1940 makeshift models, 
made in Carlow”. Also “ the UN forces suffered from the great lack of any clear 
concept of what they were supposed to do”. 1 Despite this, Irish morale 
remained good throughout its Congo experience, due mainly to the tight 
discipline within its units which came from “ the paternalistic and protective 
approach” 2 of officers towards their men.
The Irish Army overcame equipment and armament deficiencies 
to play a leading part in ONVC activities, and in so doing, it helped define the 
role of future UN peacekeeping missions. As pioneers of the UN peacekeeping 
role, the Irish Army influenced how other trouble spots throughout the world 
were handled, such as Cyprus in the 1960’s and currently in the Lebanon. 
Lessons leamt in the Congo were swiftly applied by the Irish Army hierarchy. 
Less emphasis was placed on traditional “ square bashing” in training, and 
more practical training was instituted. Officers, previously trained to remain
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aloof from the lower ranks, were now instructed to become more closely 
involved with the lower ranks- a lesson leamt in the hostile situations faced in 
the Congo where it was soon discovered that under fire, a unit was all in it 
together regardless of rank and had to rely on teamwork to achieve success. At 
home, the Army’s involvement in the Congo gave rise to a great sense of 
national consciousness, which was witnessed in the outpouring of grief 
throughout the nation, at the funerals of the victims of the Niemba ambush in 
1960. UN duty not only provided a much needed outlet for the Irish Army, it 
also raised its standing in Irish public life, with the Army finally gaining the 
support it deserved from Irish society. Its higher standing was seen in the huge 
increase in demand for recruitment places in the Army, which started to rise in 
the 1960’s and continued to this day. Though the public’s support in the Army 
has increased, this has not been reflected to any great extent in government 
circles. Successive governments have paid much lip-service to the Army, but 
have failed to significantly upgrade the F.C.A., or to bring Army pay scales on 
to an equal level to other civil-service or state bodies. Though much has been 
done in regard to equipment changes, much remains to be done. The Congo 
mission proved to be one of many successive UN peacekeeping missions 
undertaken by the Irish Army, and its unstinting service to the cause of peace 
made the Irish Army fully deserve its part of the 1988 award of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.
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